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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that the current Supreme Court is hostile to class actions and
other forms of group litigation.' One area that has received considerable attention
from the Court is the requirement that "there [be] questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class,"' and, in most class action suits for damages, that "common
questions of law or fact . .. predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members."' In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court held that, under
the statutory burdens of proof in Title VII, an employer is entitled to individual-
ized determinations before backpay can be awarded. 4 The Court further dispar-
aged judicial efforts to facilitate such class suits as "Trial by Formula."I This year,
* I would like to thank Eve Cervantez, Jim Finberg, and Jennifer Sung for introducing
me to the constitutionalized commonality argument and supporting my research.
Significant thanks are also due to Judith Resnik and David Marcus for their insights
and suggestions as I developed this Comment. This Comment benefited greatly
from the careful editing of Courtney Dixon, Rachel Wiener, Josh Weiss, James
Dawson, and the rest of the Yale Law & Policy Review staff. Finally, I am grateful to
Travis Silva, Jonathan Meltzer, and Shayak Sarkar for their insights, support, and
encouragement.
1. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REV. 78 (2011). Recent cases which
limited the availability of class litigation include American Express Co. v. Italian Col-
ors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct.
2064 (2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013); and Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
3. Id. 23(b)(3).
4- 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
5. Id. ("The Court ofAppeals believed that it was possible to replace such proceedings
with Trial by Formula.... We disapprove that novel project.").
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the Court further indicated its skepticism of claims to commonality in Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend."
Although the Supreme Court has so far limited access to collective litigation
on statutory grounds, the rulings have lent credence to a novel argument from
the class action defense bar: that commonality requirements reflect a constitu-
tional, due process guarantee.7 These due process claims are different from the
classic due process objections to class actions. Traditional due process challenges
to class actions were concerned with the rights of absent class members and issues
of res judicata and claim preclusion.! Instead, the new argument addresses sup-
posed denials of due process to defendants in class action suits. On this theory,
defendants have a due process right to individualized adjudication of liability
when plaintiffs differ in any meaningful way. Lower courts have already begun to
accept and consider this argument.9 The California Supreme Court is currently
reviewing a defendant's due process claim under their state class action statute.o
Since this due process right would require completely common issues for all
6. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433-35 (2013).
7. For one formulation of the argument, see John C. Massaro, The Emerging Federal
Class Action Brand, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 676-77 (2011). For a more critical de-
scription of the argument and a collection of briefs and cases where the argument
appears, see Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants' New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 319, 330-34 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 847 (1999) ("The legal rights of
absent class members (which in a class like this one would include claimants who
by definition may be unidentifiable when the class is certified) are resolved regard-
less of either their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their express wish to the
contrary."); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); MARTIN H. REDISH,
WHOLESALE JUSTICE 135-75 (2009) (discussing concerns about the representation of
absent class members and proposing "litigant autonomy" as a due process goal).
9. See, e.g., Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 160, 2013 WL 4028147, at *io
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2013) (Federal Rules decision noting that, when "reading Dukes
and Comcast together, it appears that there are due process implications for defend-
ants, which render the so-called 'trial by formula' approach, whereby representative
testimony is utilized to determine damages for an entire class, inappropriate where
individualized issues of proof overwhelm damages calculations"); George v. Nat'l
Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 168,181 (D. Mass. 2012) (" [T]o the extent that
there are relevant individual issues, the Corporate Defendants will be entitled, as
due process requires, later in these proceedings to show that they were in fact not
liable to a particular plaintiff under the wage laws."); see also In re Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("Essential to due pro-
cess for litigants, including both the plaintiffs and Chevron in this non-class action
context, is their right to the opportunity for an individual assessment of liability
and damages in each case.").
10. Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 391 (Ct. App.), petition for review
granted, 275 P.3d 1266 (Cal. 2012).
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plaintiffs before claims could be aggregated, I refer to the idea as "constitutional-
ized commonality."
In this Comment, I argue that constitutionalized commonality draws on
principles similar to those that drove the Court's recent shift on Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. I then address the potential consequences of an enthusias-
tic embrace of constitutionalized commonality. I close with three reasons that the
Court should not follow those Confrontation Clause intuitions and embrace
constitutionalized commonality.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZED COMMONALITY CLAIM AND CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE INTUITIONS
In aggregate litigation, members of the aggregate are often differently situ-
ated in at least some minor way." However, common issues are often more rele-
vant than the minor differences. Trial courts have developed several mechanisms
to address that circumstance, including expert statistical analysis," representative
testimony,3 bifurcated liability and damages phases,'4 fluid recovery," and bell-
wether trials."
The constitutionalized commonality argument draws on the due process
principle, derived from several early twentieth century cases, that a defendant is
entitled to "an opportunity to present every available defense" against liability.'7
Proponents of constitutionalized commonality argue that adjudicating a claim in
the aggregate necessarily threatens this principle.'" The constitutionalized com-
ii. Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability": A New Approach to Regulat-
ing Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1016 (2005).
12. See 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 10:3 (4th ed. 2002); see also In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527
F-3d 517, 532-34 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing use of statistical analysis to determine
damages for an antitrust class).
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1276-80 (11th Cir. 2010)
(approving of the use of representative testimony in a Fair Labor Standards Act
collective action and noting the common use of representative testimony in such
actions).
14. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1999).
15. See, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 570 (Cal. 1986).
16. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 140 (1972)
(describing the use of bellwether trials by the district court).
17. Linsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (citing Am. Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156, 168 (1932)).
18. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277); Answer Brief on the Merits at loo-oi, Duran v. U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. S200923 (Cal. Dec. 28, 2012).
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monality camp insists that these mechanisms deny defendants the right to pre-
sent individualized defenses to liability that may exist against specific plaintiffs. 9
Supporters contend that it is insufficient to argue individualized defenses in the
aggregate-defendants must have a right to determine the exact liability arising
from each plaintiff, or even from each alleged bad act.2 o Therefore, adjudication
in the aggregate is permissible only for issues in which the relevant questions
have either identical or indisputable answers for each member of the aggregate.
Some in the defense bar began arguing for constitutionalized commonality
shortly after the modern Rule 23 was drafted.2 ' The idea has persisted, and has
experienced a resurgence in recent years. Two leading class action treatises disa-
gree about the constitutionality of aggregate adjudication.2 2 Most notably, the ar-
gument has even made an appearance in the Supreme Court Reporter. In Philip
Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, 3 Justice Scalia stayed a Louisiana state court judgment,
noting a "strong possibility" that the constitutionalized commonality argument
would prevail at the Supreme Court." Justice Scalia's apparent embrace of the
argument, both in Philip Morris and in his dicta on class actions elsewhere, pro-
vides some insight into the intuitions behind constitutionalized commonality.
Constitutionalized commonality echoes the revolution in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that Justice Scalia led.2 5
At the core of the constitutionalized commonality claim is an imagined form
of the defendant's "day in court" ideal." According to this ideal, liability attaches
to a defendant when an individual plaintiff establishes that she has been injured
by a wrong committed by that defendant. 7 The class action mechanism merely
19. Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 18, at ioo-o; Erbsen, supra note 11, at 1039-
41; Saby Ghoshray, Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Probing
Commonality and Due Process Concerns in Modern Class Action Litigation, 44 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 467, 509 n.16i (2012).
20. 1 JOSEPH McLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:43
(9th ed. 2012).
21. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying the "every
available defense" due process argument to class action litigation).
22. Compare 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:3 (5th ed. 20n), with 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 20, § 5:43.
23. 131 S. Ct. 1 (2010) (Scalia, Circuit Justice).
24. Id. at 3-4.
25. The foundational case of this revolution was Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004). See infra Part II.
26. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) (discussing the "day in court" ideal in the context of
nonparty preclusion).
27. See David Marcus, A History of the Class Action System, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587,594 (2013) (describing an "adjectival" conception
of class actions which asserts that, "since a class action is no more than an aggregate
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acts in an "adjectival" way, almost as a mass joinder of individual plaintiffs bring-
ing claims.' The aggregate liability that may attach in a class action could be dis-
aggregated into individualized quanta of liability-one for each member of the
plaintiff class. Proponents of constitutionalized commonality argue that it would
be unjust for any one of these quanta of liability to attach to a defendant without
the defendant's ability to challenge whether each plaintiff fully meets all of the
elements of the claim. Any judicial intervention to manage the proof of liability
or to reduce cumulative evidence that interferes with a defendant's right to indi-
vidually dispute each plaintiffs circumstances thus becomes suspect.
This vision of the "day in court" echoes the doctrinal shift with regard to the
Confrontation Clause. Throughout the twentieth century, prosecutors were per-
mitted to introduce hearsay testimony against criminal defendants. In Crawford
v. Washington, the Court rejected years of precedent supporting this practice. 9
Now, criminal defendants must have the opportunity to cross-examine a declar-
ant before her testimonial statements can be admitted. Justice Scalia's majority
opinion presents a detailed originalist argument about the true purpose of the
Confrontation Clause. At the core of his argument is a "day in court" ideal about
American procedure.
The Crawford Court contrasts American visions of procedural fairness with
European inquisitorial norms. "First, the principal evil at which the Confronta-
tion Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and par-
ticularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 3o The
opinion recounts the excesses of the Spanish Inquisition and politically moti-
vated persecutions. 3' Against these excesses, the Confrontation Clause sets a sim-
ple right-the right of a defendant to fully challenge the charges that are brought
against him by cross-examining any and all witnesses, both present and absent.32
At the core of the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause is the "day in court" and
the adversarial ideal.
On first glance, the Confrontation Clause rationales seem tempting to im-
port to the civil context. The Anglo-American understanding of due process is
founded on the adversarial, as opposed to the inquisitorial, system. However, as
I discuss in the next two Parts, the Supreme Court (and lower courts who are
dealing with constitutionalized commonality arguments) would be wrong to suc-
cumb to this temptation.
of individual claims, the court that manages it should minimize, to the extent pos-
sible, its procedural deviation from ordinary processes of dispute resolution").
28. See id. at 592-98 (contrasting this adjectival approach to a regulatory conception of
the class action).
29. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Id. at 42-50.
32. Id. at 54-57.
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I. THE STAKES OF ADOPTING CONSTITUTIONALIZED COMMONALITY
Defendants have already begun to raise the constitutionalized commonality
argument in a wide range of cases. In the context of fraud, for example, defend-
ants have claimed that plaintiffs were differently situated with regard to whether
they believed the defendant's false statement.33 In the context of antitrust, defend-
ants have claimed that the collusive activity differentially affected the price that
plaintiffs paid.34
Generally, the constitutionalized commonality argument piggy-backs on an
argument under Rule 23, obscuring the potential impact of constitutionalizing
the argument. If the common issues shared by purported class members do not
predominate over their individual differences, then courts may rightfully deny
class certification under Rule 23 (b)( 3 ). However, once defendants have a consti-
tutional right to a "day in court" on every fact specific to one class member, the
line for certification will necessarily shift. Even a case in which the major issues
were shared among the class would soon become overwhelmed by small individ-
ual issues-and common issues would no longer predominate.
A constitutionalized commonality standard could go even further than Rule
23 class actions. Constitutionalized commonality would also create problems for
other federal statutes which allow for aggregate litigation. For example, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established a form of collective action which re-
quires potential plaintiffs to opt-in." The form was created to facilitate the sub-
stantive legislative goals of the Act." However, there may still be individualized
defenses that would eradicate collective action under a constitutionalized com-
monality standard; for example, in disputes about whether workers were accu-
rately classified as exempt from the FLSA's requirements, defendants sometimes
seek to defend the classification of each individual employee.3
Furthermore, a constitutionalized commonality standard would preclude
states from developing their own approaches to aggregate litigation, either
through adopting different procedural rules for class actions or by developing
different interpretations of their rules in state courts. In fact, the California Su-
preme Court is currently considering an argument from an employer that indi-
vidual bank officers' duties were too varied for the court to determine whether
33. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners
at 5-8, Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011) (No. 10-735).
34. See, e.g., Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 234-36 (Md. 2000).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
36. O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., 575 F.3d 567, 586 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Hoffmann-
La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)).
37. Brief of Appellant at 47-49, Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233 (iith
Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-12398-DD & 07-1306i-DD).
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the officers were appropriately exempted from state wage and hour laws." While
it is unclear how California will address the issue, defendants are turning to the
United States Supreme Court to invalidate aggregation-friendly class action re-
gimes in other states. 9
III. WHY CONFRONTATION CLAUSE INTUITIONS ARE MISPLACED IN CIVIL SUITS
BETWEEN PRIVATE LITIGANTS
There are three main reasons why the Court would be wrong to impose con-
stitutionalized commonality on the basis of Confrontation Clause intuitions:
doctrine, structure, and history.
A. Doctrine: Constitutionalized Commonality and Due Process
In Connecticut v. Doehr,4o the Supreme Court defined the test for due process
in the context of a civil suit between private parties. Drawing on the balancing
test that the Court first articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' the Court identified
several factors that must be balanced to determine whether a civil procedure de-
nies due process: the interest of the defendant(s), the interest of the plaintiff(s),
any state interest in the litigation, and the risk of error.42
By examining each of the Doehr factors in the context of aggregate litigation,
it becomes clear that a proper determination of the aggregate liability that a de-
fendant owes to a set of plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of due process,
even without an individualized examination of each plaintiff.
First, a defendant's sole constitutionally recognized interest is a property in-
terest in minimizing the final, and full, amount for which they are found liable.43
38. Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 391 (Ct. App.), petition for review
granted, 275 P-3d 1266 (Cal. 2012).
39. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kia Motors Am., Inc. v. Samuel-Bassett, 133
S. Ct. 51 (2012) (No. 11-1257) (challenging Pennsylvania's class action regime).
40. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
41. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
42. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at ii.
43. Defendants sometimes argue that there is an interest in accurately determining lia-
bility or in confronting accusers. These interests are not "life, liberty, and property"
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no constitutional in-
terest in reputational harms, such as the bare fact of being found liable (as opposed
to the financial consequences of such a finding). Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Therefore, these purported interests collapse into the protected interest of financial
liability at the end or are concerns about the procedure used to find that liability.
They are better addressed when considering "risk of error." Finding a due process
liberty or property interest in the procedure itself would turn the Mathews/Doehr
framework in on itself. How do you determine the procedure that must be com-
pleted before you can take away an aspect of the procedure?
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By contrast, class action plaintiffs generally have an interest in determining lia-
bility in the aggregate: individual class action claims are often relatively small-
too small to offset the cost of prosecuting each claim individually. However, if
the interests of the defendant and plaintiffs seem balanced, the other two factors
tip the scales toward aggregate adjudication.
On the risk of error factor, there is little reason to believe that a large number
of small adjudications will reach a result that is more accurate than a carefully
managed process that determines liability in the aggregate using statistical tech-
niques.44 Finally, the government has an interest in ensuring that plaintiffs can
access their common law and statutory rights. Often, aggregate litigation-or the
threat of it-attempts to serve the government interest in deterring unlawful be-
havior by would-be defendants. 45 Thus, a proper application of the current due
process doctrine would find aggregate determinations of liability to be appropri-
ate.
B. Structure: Criminal Procedure Protections in Civil Contexts
Even if the Court decided to disregard its due process jurisprudence, it would
still be imprudent to apply Confrontation Clause principles from the criminal
law. To show why the application of criminal due process concerns to the civil
context would be so strange, consider the application of two criminal due process
rights to civil contexts in which liberty, rather than property, interests are at stake.
One would think that liberty interests would be more carefully protected by the
Court.
First, the Court has not established a categorical right to counsel in civil cases
involving deprivations of liberty, instead requiring only a showing that proce-
dures meet the standard of fundamental fairness.46 Similarly, a wide range of ev-
identiary protections, including the exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, do not apply in civil contexts. These issues
have been most fully litigated in the immigration context.47
44. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for "Trial by Formula," 90 TEx. L. REV. 571, 612-18
(2012).
45. Cf State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 570-71 (Cal. 1986).
46. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (civil contempt); Travis Silva, Note, To-
ward a Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
227, 266-68 (2012) (immigration courts).
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C. History: The American Tradition ofJudicial Flexibility
Of course, current doctrine and the applications of other categorical criminal
procedure rules would be irrelevant if there was a strong argument that the Fram-
ers clearly opposed the kind of judicial management that aggregate liability re-
quires. However, there is no such history. Including in the years immediately af-
ter the Founding, judges were understood to have a certain amount of flexibility
in determining how to try a case. That flexibility applied both to the evidentiary
standards required to prove liability and to certain forms of group litigation.
Legal historians have recently uncovered a number of inquisitorial ap-
proaches to evidence gathering and evidentiary standards that were in place at
the moments that the Framers established constitutional due process. Before rat-
ification, courts frequently relied on "conclusive presumptions" to restrict the
facts and defenses that a party could present and carefully restricted oral testi-
monyby parties to litigation in favor of written evidence.48 In the nineteenth cen-
tury, courts continued to apply judicial and legislative presumptions to limit the
defenses available to litigants.49 Courts of equity used procedures that resembled
inquisitorial approaches into the late nineteenth century."o It was only in the late
nineteenth century that the American bar embraced adversarial process as the
driving ideology of civil litigation.51 Once the adversarial hearing became the
mark of procedural fairness, it became more important for litigants to determine
which facts to present. The Supreme Court, at the turn of the century, began to
critically analyze evidentiary presumptions to ensure that defendants had "a rea-
sonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing
upon the issue."" However, these "all available defenses" principles arose long
after both the Framing and the Reconstruction.
The history of group litigation in English and American courts is even better
documented. Anglo-American courts determined rights in the aggregate as far
back as the Middle Ages.53 Ironically, many of the classes involved aggregates on
the defendant side, determining the rights of absent parties who were not able to
48. Moller, supra note 7, at 342-48.
49. Id. at 348-65.
50. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and a
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1231-33 (2005).
51. Moller, supra note 7, at 370-71.
52. Mobile, Jackson, & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (iio); see
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas CO., 220 U.S. 61, 82 (1911) (declaring the statute at
issue "establishes a rebuttable presumption, but neither prevents the presentation
of other evidence to overcome it nor cuts off the right to make a full defense").
53. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 72-99 (1987).
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present the defenses they might have preferred.5 4 Justice Story himself addressed
the possibility of aggregate litigation: "[A]s to parties . . . where they are exceed-
ingly numerous, and it would be impracticable to join them without almost in-
terminable delays and other inconveniences . ... In such cases, the Court . .. will
dispense with them... if it can be done without injury to the persons not actually
before the Court."55 Thus, early authorities recognized that judges should have
leeway to manage cases in order to adjudicate fairly without unnecessarily en-
cumbering the process.
CONCLUSION
It is extremely likely that the Supreme Court will address the constitutional-
ized commonality claim in the coming years. When the Court considers it, the
"day in court" ideal and corresponding Confrontation Clause principles will
likely tempt the Court into adopting constitutionalized commonality. Since the
due process argument for constitutionalized commonality fails on doctrinal,
structural, and originalist grounds, one would hope that the Court would reject
the claim. However, scholars should further investigate and analyze the constitu-
tionalized commonality claim to ensure that plaintiffs will continue to have ac-
cess to the procedural mechanisms that are necessary for them to fully vindicate
their rights.
54. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of
the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1862-82 (1998) (discussing
three forms of aggregate litigation in the eighteenth century, with examples of de-
fendant aggregates: bills of peace, creditor and legatee bills, and suits against unin-
corporated associations).
55. Id. at 1878-79 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 94
(2d ed. 1840)).
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